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I. INTRODUCTION
Payday loans cost American consumers an estimated $3.4
billion a year in excessive interest and fees.' Borrowers in North
Carolina have spent over $50 million on exorbitant fees on payday loans
since 2001 when the state's regulations on payday lending expired.2 In
2004, payday lenders across the country, gripping money in hand,
watched as the federal district court for the Northern District of Georgia
decided the fate of their businesses in that state.3 Payday lenders' grip
on the business of payday lending through "rent-a-charter ' 4 practices
loosened as the federal court decided to give more control over
regulating the business to Georgia state lawmakers.5
In Bankwest v. Baker, the court considered new lending laws in
Georgia, which sought to reach out-of-state banks operating through
agents in Georgia to evade state usury laws, a practice known as rent-a-
charter.6 The court upheld new statutory limitations placed upon the
business of payday lending in Georgia, which will likely lead to similar
legislation in other states.' As a result of Bankwest, payday lenders will
be forced to restructure their businesses, even where the lenders are out-
of-state banks operating through agents in the state of business.8
Bankwest restricts the exportation of interest rates from a bank's home
state to borrowers in another state regulating payday lending if the bank
uses an agent as the de facto lender. 9 The elimination of this rent-a-
charter arrangement will subject payday lenders to state usury laws and
1. Steve Hartsoe, N.C. Officials Investigating Payday Lending Company, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER., Aug. 27, 2004, at 3D, available at http://www.aberdeennews.com/mld/
charlotte/news/breaking-news/9505664.htm.
2. Id.
3. Bankwest v. Baker, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
4. See infra text accompanying note 6.
5. Bankwest, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 1340-42.
6. Id. at 1356-58.
7. Id.
8. See infra notes 139-54 and accompanying text.
9. Bankwest v. Baker, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1346 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
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will lead to greater consumer protection, as payday lenders will no
longer be able to take advantage of Georgia citizens by collecting these
excessive interest rates.' 0
Part II of this Note provides background information regarding
payday lending practices and discusses state regulations on this type of
lending.'1 Part III examines how out-of-state banks export interest rates
from the bank's home state to borrowers in a state regulating payday
lending, how regulators react to these arrangements, and how North
Carolina handles such arrangements. 12 Part IV provides information
about Georgia's new legislation outlawing payday loans by agents who
operate as the de facto lender.
13 Part V discusses Bankwest v. Baker
14
and the court's holding that the state statute at issue is not preempted by
federal regulations.' 5 Part VI considers the potential effect Bankwest v.
Baker will have on other states' payday lending legislation and
implications this case's holding may have on bank rent-a-charter
schemes. 6 Ultimately this Note concludes that Bankwest v. Baker is the
beginning of a new wave of payday lending legislation that will drive
payday lenders out of rent-a-charter arrangements.
17
II. PAYDAY LENDING AND CURRENT STATE LIMITATIONS
A. Payday Lending and Its Pitfalls
Payday lending garnered $45 billion in revenue in 2002 and is
called "the fastest growing segment of the fringe banking economy."' 8
Payday loans are short-term, high interest loans that typically target
low-income individuals.' 9 Generally, a borrower post-dates a check to
10. Id. at 1357.
11. See infra notes 18-46 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 47-95 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
14. Bankwest, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 1333.
15. See infra notes 103-41 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 142-66 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 167-78 and accompanying text.
18. Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General, New York Sues to Stop
Illegal Payday Lending Scheme (Sept. 24, 2003), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/
press/2003/sep/sep24a_.03.html.
19. FDIC, GUIDELINES FOR PAYDAY LENDING, at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/
safety/payday/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2004). The FDIC refers to payday loans as "deferred
deposit advances ... usually priced at a fixed dollar fee, which represents the finance charge
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the lender, usually within two weeks of receiving the loan, and the
check total includes the principal amount of the loan, as well as a fee
charged by the lender.20 The loans are called "payday loans" because
generally the loan matures within the next two to four weeks on the
borrower's next payday.21
The high annual percentage rate (APR) on these short-term
loans results in a huge expense to borrowers.22 For example, a borrower
may take a $200 loan from a payday lender until his next paycheck in
two weeks, writing a check to the lender for $230, which includes the
principal in addition to 15% interest on the two-week loan. 23 The $30
interest on the two-week loan amounts to an APR of 391%.24 The
plaintiff banks in Bankwest v. Baker, state-chartered banks in Delaware
and South Dakota,25 charged interest and fees for payday loans ranging
from 17% to 27% of the loan balance, depending upon the specifics of
each loan.26 Such fees amounted to an APR between 443% and 520%.27
Payday lenders in other parts of the country collect APRs on loan
ranging anywhere from 200% to 900%.28 These payday lenders
maintain that they offer a service to consumers who may be unable to
obtain such loans elsewhere. 29 However, critics argue payday loans
offer no help to a borrower in the end, because borrowers typically
increase their debt from pay period to pay period.3 ° Payday loans are
thought of as cyclic loans that propel borrowers into greater debt
to the borrower." Id. The FDIC defines payday loans as "small-dollar, short-term,
unsecured loans that borrowers promise to repay out of their next... regular income
payment." Id.
20. Id.
21. Bankwestv. Baker, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1339 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
22. See FDIC, GUIDELINES FOR PAYDAY LENDING, supra note 19.
23. See CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORPORATIONS, PAYDAY LENDING FACT SHEET, at
http://www.corp.ca.gov/pub/payday.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2004).
24. Id.
25. Bankwest, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 1339.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. STATE EMPLOYEES CREDIT UNION, SALARY ADVANCE, at http://www.ncsecu.org
/Loans/Personal/SALO.asp (last visited Sept. 25, 2004).
29. See CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 23. Although the
website is designed for consumer protection, it acknowledges that payday lenders offer a
way to "cover unexpected expenses like car repairs." Id.
30. Fred Tannenbaum, Local Payday Lender Had an Offer State Could Refuse,
CHARLOTTE Bus. J., Dec. 20, 2002, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/charlotte/
stories/2002/12/23/story5.html.
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because insufficient funds force many borrowers to roll over the loan at
the next payday.31 In fact, payday loan borrowers are significantly more
likely than other adults to have filed for bankruptcy.32
The Center for Responsible Lending, a consumer advocate
group opposing predatory lending, estimates that payday loans cost
Americans over $3.4 billion a year in fees.33 A payday loan study
conducted in Illinois indicates over 20% of payday loan borrowers have
twenty or more loans in a single year.34 The Georgia General Assembly
passed the Payday Lending Act (the Act)35 challenged in Bankwest v.
Baker after determining that such loans especially affect military
personnel, the elderly, and economically disadvantaged citizens.36 The
cycle of payday loans is inescapable for these borrowers because the
interest rate charged on such loans is so high that their next paychecks
are insufficient to repay the loan balance.37
B. Current State Payday Lending Limitations
Payday lending has a poor reputation among lawmakers and
consumer advocates in most states. 38  Currently, payday lending is
outlawed in seventeen states and is regulated in the remaining thirty-
three states to varying degrees, but no state addressed rent-a-charter
arrangements until the Georgia Act.39 The estimated 14,000 payday
loan outlets in the U.S. are spread across the country, with California
leading the pack with 2,000 outlets.40 California reportedly has "more
payday loan offices than it does McDonalds or Burger King
31. Id.
32. Michael A. Stegman & Robert Faris, Payday Lending: A Business Model that
Encourages Chronic Borrowing, 17 ECON. DEV. Q. 8, 15 (Feb. 2003). Payday loan
borrowers are "four times more likely than all adults to have filed for bankruptcy." Id.
33. See Hartsoe, supra note 1. The Center for Responsible Lending has offices in
Durham, N.C. and Washington, D.C., available at http://www.responsiblelending.org.
34. COMMUNITY ACTION PROJECT, Payday Lending Bill SB 583: A Legalized Form of
Loan Sharking, at http://www.captc.org/pubpol/information-on-payday-lending-and-sb
583.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2004).
35. GA. CODEANN. § 16-17-1 to -10 (2004).
36. § 16-17-1(c).
37. See Tannenbaum, supra note 30.
38. See infra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
39. See Stegman & Faris, supra note 32, at 9.
40. See id.
272 [Vol. 9
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establishments.",4' Florida, Illinois, and Missouri all have over 500
payday outlets within their borders and Washington state has just fewer
than 500.42 In 2002, Oklahoma banned payday loans, yet lenders
engaging in rent-a-charter practices with federally or state-chartered
banks still evade the Oklahoma lending laws.43 In 2003, fourteen states
enacted some sort of payday lending legislation,44 ranging from
licensing requirements for lenders, to conspicuous fee disclosures, and
even to requiring that borrowers be able to make partial payments on
such loans.45 These regulations all reflect a desire by states to
discourage payday lending within their borders.46
III. EXPORTING INTEREST RATES TO REACH BORROWERS IN OTHERWISE
UNREACHABLE MARKETS
A. The Exportation of Interest Rates
Many out-of-state payday lenders currently use in-state agents
to carry out their business.47 Lenders can avoid state caps on interest
rates by conducting business under the more favorable usury laws of the
state in which the out-of-state bank is located.48  This practice is
commonly known as a rent-a-charter arrangement, because national
banks essentially loan their out their charters to agents in another state,
41. See Stegman & Fais, supra note 32, at 9.
42. See id.
43. See COMMUNITY ACTION PROJECT, supra note 34.
44. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2003 ENACTED PAYDAY
LENDING LEGISLATION, at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/banking/PaydayLend-2003.htm
(last visited Sept. 25, 2004). States that passed such legislation include Alabama, Alaska,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. Id.
45. Id. Alabama, Idaho, Illinois all require licenses for payday lenders, while Virginia
requires payday lenders to conspicuously disclose fees to potential borrowers in all
advertising materials. Id. Utah mandates that borrowers be able to make partial payments
on payday loans and that they have the opportunity to rescind such a loan the next business
day. Id.
46. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
47. Bankwest v. Baker, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (N.D. Ga. 2004). Plaintiff banks, state-
chartered banks in Delaware and South Dakota, partnered with agents in Georgia to offer
payday loans that in-state lenders in Georgia could not offer. Id.
48. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Comptroller Calls
Preemption a Major Advantage of National Bank Charters, (Feb. 12, 2002) available at
2002 WL 208161 [hereinafter OCC Press Release].
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and such arrangements are condemned by the OCC.49 Agents facilitate
this business by setting up shop in a market otherwise unreachable by
the bank, and in return the banks generally give agents a majority share
of the revenue generated from the payday loans.5 ° The agents in
Bankwest v. Baker received 81% of the revenue from the payday loans
they orchestrated, indicating that the banks involved essentially rented
out their charters for agents to use, with hardly any bank involvement in
making the loans.51
The rent-a-charter arrangement permits state banks to export the
interest rates of their home states to borrowers in a state with less
favorable usury laws. The Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA)
provides that a state or national bank may charge any interest rate
allowed by the state where the bank is located, regardless of the
borrower's location.53 Thus, a bank may export the interest rate of its
home state to borrowers in states with usury laws less favorable to the
bank.54 Payday loan outlets then partner with both state and national
49. Id.
50. See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
51. Bankwest, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 1340.
52. See OCC Press Release, supra note 48.
53. See 12 U.S.C. § 183ld(a) (2001). The statute specifically states that a State bank
may, notwithstanding any State constitution or statute which is hereby
preempted for the purposes of this section, take, receive, reserve, and
charge on any loan.., or upon any note.., interest at the rate allowed
by the laws of the State ... where the bank is located." Id.; see also 12
U.S.C. § 85 (2001). "Any association may take, receive, reserve, and
charge on any loan or discount made, or upon any notes, bills of
exchange, or other evidence of debt, interest at the rate allowed by the
laws of the State, Territory, or District where the bank is located, or at a
rate of 1 per centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day
commercial paper in effect at the Federal reserve bank in the Federal
reserve district where the bank is located, whichever may be the greater,
and no more, except that where by the laws of any State a different rate
is limited for banks organized under state laws, the rate so limited shall
be allowed for associations organized or existing in any such State
under this Chapter.
Id.
54. See OCC Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264, 46,265 (Aug.
5, 2003). The order indicates that national banks are not subject to the restrictions state
lending laws impose in a borrower's home state. Id. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) applies the
exportation of interest rates to state banks under this portion of the FDIA. A
State bank or such insured branch of a foreign bank may,
notwithstanding any State constitution or statute which is hereby
preempted for the purposes of this section, take, receive, reserve, and
charge on any loan or discount made, or upon any note, bill of
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out-of-state banks in order to export interest rates of the bank's home
state to borrowers anywhere.55
B. Federal Bank Regulators' Views on Payday Lending
Rent-a-charter practices are commonplace in payday lending in
order for out-of-state banks to evade state usury laws.
56  The OCC,
which regulates national banks, disapproves of the use of this
arrangement by lenders to avoid state usury laws, and believes that an
agency relationship, such as the one seen in Bankwest, is an abuse of a
bank's national charter and creates safety and soundness issues for the
bank in the agency relationship.57 The OCC has taken enforcement
actions in recent years after finding abuses in relationships where banks
rent out their charters to third party payday lenders.
58 Abuses include
"deceptive marketing practices, failure to secure confidential customer
files, [and] unsafe and unsound lending. 59 In 2003, the OCC ordered
Peoples National Bank of Paris, Texas to pay a $175,000 civil money
penalty and to terminate its relationship with Advance America, its
payday lending agent in Texas, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania.
6 °
Then Comptroller of the Currency, John D. Hawke, Jr., condemned
rent-a-charter arrangements, arguing that national bank preemption of
exchange, or other evidence of debt, interest at a rate of not more than 1
per centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial
paper in effect at the Federal Reserve bank in the Federal Reserve
district where such State bank or such insured branch of a foreign bank
is located or at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, territory, or
district where the bank is located, whichever may be greater.
§ 1831d(a).
55. Tasha L. Winebarger, Payday Lending: The Beginning of the End: The Demise of
Bank Partnerships with Payday Lenders, 7 N.C. BANK. INST. 317, 321 (2003). Provides
additional discussion of the exportation of interest rates by banks under § 1831d of the
FDIA and § 85 of the National Bank Act. Id.
56. Bankwest v. Baker, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (N.D. Ga. 2004). This was the agreement
between the plaintiff banks, who had no physical presence in Georgia, and the Agent
Advance America who had retail space in Georgia to offer payday loans. Id.
57. See OCC Press Release, supra note 48; see also supra note 49 and accompanying
text.
58. oCC, CONSUMER PROTECTION NEWS, at http://www.occ.treas.gov/Consumerl
payday.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2004).
59. Id.
60. In the Matter of: Advance America, Cash Advance Centers, Inc. Agent and Bank
Service Provider for: Peoples National Bank, U.S. Dep't of Treasury O.C.C., available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/eas/ea2002-2pdf (Jan. 31, 2003).
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state usury laws is not property that banks may rent out to others.61
The FDIC, the federal regulator of state banks, posits that such
agency relationships pose a risk to a bank's reputation and threatens to
increase the legal risks involved in lending transactions. 62 The FDIC
has set forth guidelines for payday lending but thus far has not brought
any enforcement actions against banks engaging in this practice.63 For
this reason, payday lending agents typically engage in relationships with
state chartered banks, where little threat of an enforcement action
exists.64 However, there is a public rift within the FDIC regarding
payday lending.65 One member "broke ranks" with FDIC Chairman
Donald Powell and criticized banks engaged in rent-a-charter practices,
arguing that the practice is merely a way to avoid compliance with state
usury laws.66 This split within the FDIC may be troubling for banks in
rent-a-charter relationships, like those in Bankwest v. Baker, who have
viewed the FDIC as "the last refuge of payday lenders. 67
The Federal Reserve Board (FRB), which regulates state
member banks, is also concerned about banks developing relationships
with payday lending outlets.68 SunTrust Banks, Inc., based in Atlanta,
told the FRB in Atlanta that it has severed its relationships with payday
lending outlets.69 Citing unfavorable public perception of payday
lending, as well as the potential harm to consumers and the bank's
reputation, SunTrust voluntarily ceased all rent-a-charter type
relationships with payday outlets.7° Several merger decisions raised the
issue, and the FRB expressed worry that these relationships are
unsound, but it has yet to block a merger because of a bank's
61. See OCC Press Release, supra note 48. Then Comptroller Hawke argued that
preemption is "not like excess space in a bank-owned office building. It is an inalienable
right of the bank itself [which may not be rented]." Id.
62. See FDIC, supra note 19.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See infra note 66.
66. Hannah Bergman, Signaling Split, FDIC's Curry Assails Payday Lending Pacts,
AM. BANKER, Oct. 1, 2004, at 4.
67. Id. (quoting Matthew Lee, the director of Inner City Press/Community on the
Move).
68. Hannah Bergman, SunTrust Won't Lend to Payday Lenders: Citing Reputation Risk,
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relationship with a payday loan outlet.71
With the OCC condemning "rent-a-charter" practices, the FDIC
cautioning payday lenders, and the FRB expressing concern over banks'
relationships with payday loan outlets, payday lending does not appear
to garner support on a federal agency level.72 State legislators are
pushing for the FDIC to eliminate rent-a-charter arrangements so that
state usury laws will govern all payday lending.73 Although the future
of banks' relationships with payday loan outlets is not yet decided, the
overwhelming trend is to eliminate such partnerships because of the risk
they pose to the banks themselves.74
C. Payday Lending in North Carolina
The unpopularity of payday lending is apparent among state
governments across the country.75 States, including North Carolina,
have actively attempted to regulate payday lending.76 However, in
2001, North Carolina let a payday lending law expire without
replacement.77 Since that time, Attorney General Roy Cooper has
pursued payday lenders, including Advance America and America's
Cash Express, 78 whom he says may be using an out-of-state bank to
avoid compliance with North Carolina law.79
In September 2004, Cooper obtained a subpoena for Advance
America 80 documents and for mandatory Advance America employee
71. Id.; see also Hartsoe, supra note I and accompanying text. Although regulators
express concerns that payday lending is unsafe and unsound, the industry garners $3.4
billion dollars a year in interest and fees. See Hartsoe, supra note 1.
72. See supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
73. See Bergman, supra note 68.
74. See supra notes 57-71 and accompanying text.
75. See CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 23. California's
Department of Corporations suggests borrowing money from friends or relatives or asking
creditors to extend a bill payment period, rather than obtain a payday loan. Id.; see also
MASSACHUSETTS DIVISION OF BANKS, Internet Payday Loans-Risky Business, at
http://www.mass.gov/dob/payday.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2004). The Massachusetts
Division of Banks still "strongly cautions" consumers "to avoid payday lenders," and the
state capped the APR on loans under $6,000 at twenty-three percent. Id.
76. See infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
77. See Hartsoe, supra note 1.
78. See id.; see also Tannenbaum, supra note 30.
79. See Hartsoe, supra note 1.
80. See id. A payday lender operating in North Carolina, also the agent used by
Bankwest in the Georgia case of Bankwest v. Baker. Id.
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attendance at a public hearing in Raleigh. 8' Advance America has 100
payday lending outlets in North Carolina and over 2,000 other such
facilities in thirty-five other states. 82 Advance America offers payday
loans to customers in connection with Republic Bank and Trust Co. of
Louisville.83 In 2002, America's Cash Express, another payday lending
agent in North Carolina, struck an agreement with the Attorney
General's office to cease its payday lending in this state.84 However, by
the following week the company did not discontinue such lending to
North Carolina citizens.85 America's Cash Express, which is linked
with an out-of-state bank, argues, along with other payday lenders
operating in North Carolina, that rent-a-charter arrangements are a
legitimate means to offer such loans.86 Payday lending outlets use this
so-called loophole to continue to operate within North Carolina's
borders.87
Alternatives to payday lending have emerged in North Carolina
amidst the legal battle to outlaw these lenders. 88 The State Employees'
Credit Union (SECU) has developed a program called Salary Advance,
which offers borrowers in need of short-term loans an alternative to
costly payday loans. 89 The program offers loans of up to $500, with no
transaction fees and an interest rate of 11.75%. 9o The loan and interest
are automatically debited from the SECU member's account at the
borrower's next payday. 9' Along with this short-term loan, SECU
offers free financial counseling to assist its members in breaking the
payday loan cycle.92 SECU also mandates that 5% of every Salary
Advance Loan will be placed in a Salary Advance Cash Account and
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Hannah Bergman, In Brief: Advance America Under Scrutiny in N.C., AM. BANKER,
Aug. 30, 2004, at 20.
84. See Tannenbaum, supra note 30.
85. See id. The company continued to offer "14-day loans at a fee of $17 for every $100
borrowed." Id.
86. See id. America's Cash Express and other payday lending agents argue that if an
out-of-state bank is located in a state that permits payday lending, the agents should be
allowed to operate under those permissive laws as well. Id.
87. See id.
88. See infra text accompanying notes 89-95.






used as collateral for the loan.93 Members of SECU may only withdraw
from this Cash Account after meeting with a SECU lending official.
94
This program aims to break the payday loan cycle many borrowers fall
into, while promoting sound saving and borrowing practices.
9
IV. GEORGIA'S NEW PAYDAY LENDING LAW
Frustrated by the financial hardships payday loans wreaked
upon consumers in their state, the Georgia General Assembly enacted
the new payday lending statute to eliminate payday lending and to
prevent rent-a-charter practices from evading its usury laws.
96 Payday
lending in Georgia is defined as "all transactions in which funds are
advanced to be repaid at a later date, notwithstanding the fact that the
transaction contains one or more other elements, and a 'payday lender'
shall be one who engaged in such transactions." 97 The Act strengthens
the penalties for those who engage in payday lending activities.
98 The
Act addresses the relationship out-of-state banks form with in-state
agents:
The General Assembly declares that the use of agency
or partnership agreements between in-state entities and
out-of-state banks, whereby the in-state agent holds a
predominant economic interest in the revenues
generated by payday loans made to Georgia residents, is
a scheme or contrivance by which the agent seeks to
circumvent ... the usury statutes of this state.99
The Act considers an agent to be a "de facto lender if the entire
circumstances of the transaction show that the purported agent holds,
acquires, or maintains a predominant economic interest in the revenues
generated by the loan."' 00 Neither the Act nor the courts have defined
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.




100. § 16-17-2(b)(4). The de facto provisions were challenged by plaintiff banks in
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the term "predominant economic interest."' 0 ' Although the Act is aimed
at banks, payday loan agents of the banks are subject to the new
legislation if they receive a "predominant economic interest" of the
revenue the loans bring to the lending institution. 1
02
V. BANKWEST v. BAKER AND ITS HOLDING
A. Bankwest v. Baker Case Background
Plaintiff banks in Bankwest v. Baker filed suit to get a
preliminary injunction enjoining the application of the new Georgia
payday lending law.10 3  Plaintiff banks, state-chartered banks in
Delaware and South Dakota, had non-bank agents (Agents) located in
the state of Georgia to attract borrowers and market the payday loans.'0
The Agents included only one Georgia corporation. 10 5 The Agents set
up retail locations in Georgia at which borrowers could apply for
payday loans, and the Agents' duties were to market and service the
loans, as well as to collect payments and report to the banks providing
the funds for the loans. 0 6 Plaintiff banks established "the terms and
features of the loans, including the loan amounts, fees and charges,
interest rates, repayment terms, credit limits, and credit standards."'0 7
In filing suit to enjoin the application of the Act, plaintiff banks
set forth several arguments, but their primary argument was for federal
preemption of the Georgia statute. 108 Plaintiff banks challenged the Act,
arguing provisions in the FDIA preempt it.'09 Plaintiff banks also
Bankwest v. Baker as being unconstitutionally vague. Id.
101. § 16-17-1, 2; see also Bankwest v. Baker, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
102. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-17-2(b) (2004).
103. Bankwest, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1333; see infra notes 108-110 and accompanying text
for plaintiff banks' arguments.
104. Bankwest, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 1339.
105. Id. The Agents included Advance America, Cash Advance Centers, First America
Cash Advance, Cash America Financial Services, Inc., Georgia Cash America, Inc.,
Creditcorp of Georgia, and Express Check of Georgia. Id.
106. Id. at 1340.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1343-44.
109. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d (2001); see also Bankwest v. Baker, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1333,
1353-54 (N.D. Ga. 2004). Plaintiff banks also argue that the Federal Arbitration Act 9
U.S.C. § 1-2 (FAA) preempts the Georgia Act, but the court found that arbitration
agreements may be rendered invalid on the basis of unconscionability. Id.
Unconscionability of payday loans was a driving force behind the Georgia legislature's
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argued that the Act violated the interstate commerce clause, that
classifying agents as de facto lenders is "unconstitutionally vague," and
that the Act is an "unconstitutional ex post facto law."
' 10
In Bankwest v. Baker, the court examined the relationship
between Bankwest and its agent, Advance America.11' In exchange for
its services to Bankwest, Advance America received 81% of the loan
revenues."' State and national banks are allowed to export the interest
rates of the state in which the bank is located to a borrower in another
state, permitting the banks to choose the most advantageous usury laws
under which to conduct business." 3  Plaintiff banks in Bankwest v.
Baker argued that this right of exportation of interest rates encompasses
the business of payday lending, and therefore the Georgia Act cannot
reach them."
14
B. Bankwest v. Baker Holds Georgia's Legislation Not Preempted
by Existing Federal Regulations
The court held that the FDIA does not preempt the Act, holding
there was "nothing in the federal banking laws or the cases applying
them that gives banks and their purported agents the sole and exclusive
right to define the nature of their relationship and their transactions...
for the sole purpose of avoiding the application of state usury 
laws."'"15
The court assumed that federal law does not preempt state police
powers unless that was the unmistakable Congressional intent." 
6 The
court evaluated plaintiffs' argument for preemption under the FDIA by
looking at the structure and the purpose of Georgia's new Act."
7
Preemption under this evaluation may occur either through field
decision to enact this new lending law, therefore the Act does not violate the FAA. Id. The
court cites to Doctor's Association, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996), which held
that "fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements
without contravening § 2 [of the FAA]." Id.
110. Bankwest, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 1344.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1340.
113. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
114. Bankwest, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1333.
115. Bankwest v. Baker, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1351 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
116. Id. at 1344 (citing Cliff v. Payco Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 363 F.3d 1113, 1122
(2004)).
117. Id. at 1345 (citing Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31
(1996)).
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preemption,' 18 where Congress clearly occupies the field and states may
not add additional regulations," 9 or conflict preemption, where both
federal and state law cannot be complied with simultaneously or state
law impedes complying with federal law. 20  The court held that
federally insured state banks must comply with both state and federal
regulations and no field preemption exists.' 2' Nor is there conflict
preemption, because the Act does not prevent lenders from complying
with federal law. 122 State banks are permitted to charge the interest rate
permissible in the state in which the bank is located under the FDIA
and, therefore, have a right to export these interest rates to the state in
which the borrower is located. 23 The Act does not prevent payday
lenders from exporting their state's interest rates; it prohibits them from
using an agent who receives a predominant economic interest in the
loan to export the rates. 24  The de facto lender provisions do not
prohibit out-of-state banks from payday lending because plaintiff banks
may still offer payday loans through in-state agents simply by altering
their business structure.
25
These provisions indicate only that an in-state agent may not
hold "a predominant economic interest" in the payday loan revenues.126
Out-of-state banks are free to structure an agency relationship that
meets this statutory requirement, and, thereby, continue providing
payday loans in Georgia. 27 The court did not reach the issue of what
constitutes a "predominant economic interest" in the loan revenues,
because in Bankwest v. Baker, Advance America received 81% of the
loan revenues, clearly a "predominant economic interest.'
128
Plaintiff banks also failed to persuade the court with their
interstate commerce argument. 129  Georgia-based lenders are not
permitted to engage in payday lending at all, while out-of-state banks
118. Cliff v. Payco Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 363 F.3d 1113, 1122 (2004).
119. Bankwest, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 1345.
120. Cliff, 363 F.3d at 1122.
121. Bankwest v. Baker, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1345 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
122. Id.
123. Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 183 ld(a) (2001).
124. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-17-1(c) (2004).
125. Bankwest, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 1346.
126. § 16-17-1(c).
127. Bankwest, at 1352.
128. Id. at 1333.
129. Id. at 1352.
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may do so if their agents receive "less than a predominant economic
interest in the loan revenues."' 130  Usury laws regulate the amount of
interest lenders are able to charge borrowers.'13  State usury laws vary,
and states such as Delaware and South Dakota, under which the plaintiff
banks in Bankwest v. Baker were chartered, do not limit the interest
rates charged on loans at all. 132 Because of the exportation of interest
rates permitted under 12 U.S.C. § 1831d by state banks, plaintiff banks
in Bankwest v. Baker may operate under the usury laws of the state in
which they are located. 133  This means that out-of-state banks are
actually subject to fewer restrictions under the Act than lenders based in
Georgia; therefore, the Act does not discriminate against out-of-state
lenders.
134
Nor was the court swayed by plaintiff banks' argument that as
no guidelines exist to outline what constitutes a "predominant economic
interest,"'135 the de facto lender provisions in the Act are
unconstitutionally vague. 136 The court reasoned that plaintiff banks had
to demonstrate that ordinary persons could not understand the law as
applied to the facts of this case, which the court held plaintiff banks did
not do. 137 Furthermore, Bankwest's agreement with Advance America
provided that "the borrower pays $17 in interest for every $100
borrowed, and Advance America receives $13.80, or 81% of that."'
138
The court reasoned that this agreement clearly reflected that the Agent
received "a predominant economic interest"'
39 in the loan. 140
Bankwest appealed the district court decision and the Eleventh
Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals heard arguments July 21, 2004.14' No
130. Id.
131. LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL
SERVICE ACTIVITIES 351 (2d ed. 2004).
132. Id.
133. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(2) (2001).
134. Bankwest v. Baker, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1352 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
135. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-17-1(c) (2004).
136. Bankwest, 324 F.Supp. at 1354-55.
137. Id. at 1355.
138. Id.
139. § 16-17-1(c).
140. Bankwest at 1355.
141. E-mail from Michael C. Russ, Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants BankWest, Inc.,
Advance America, Cash Advance Centers of Georgia, Inc., King & Spaulding, LLP, to
Lissa L. Broome, Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law (Oct. 26,
2004).
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decision has come down from this court since the oral arguments.
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE BANKWEST V. BAKER HOLDING
A. The De Facto Lender Provision and Ways Banks May Get
Around It
The Bankwest court upheld the newly passed Georgia Payday
Lending Act. 142  This holding forces plaintiff banks to alter their
business structure to meet the Act's requirements with regard to an
agent's take of revenue. 43  The court speculated that this transition
would result in a loss of revenue for plaintiff banks as they would have
to restructure the lending process but was not persuaded that this
financial harm to banks merited judicial protection.'44 The court noted
that agents could continue operating in Georgia, they simply must alter
what percentage of the loan revenues they receive.1 45 Although agents
may still offer payday loans in connection with out-of-state banks, the
Act will likely deter many agents from doing so, because they can no
longer receive a predominant interest in the revenues from the loans.
146
In upholding the Act, the court reasoned that the harm of such loans on
Georgia citizens is greater than potential harms plaintiff banks may
encounter in adhering to the Act. 
147
These changes to payday lending in Georgia indicate that out-
of-state banks will have to dramatically alter their lending practices to
stay in business.148 Payday loan outlets typically give 5% to 15% of the
fees garnered from the loans to the out-of-state banks who actually own
the loans. 149 Therefore, if agents are unable to receive a "predominant
142. Bankwest v. Baker, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1356 (N.D. Ga. 2004). In upholding the
Act, the court also examined whether it was an ex post facto law, but found that nothing in
the Act indicated it was applied retroactively, therefore the Act was constitutional. Id.





148. Bankwest v. Baker, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2004). The relationship
of payday lenders and their agents in this case provide for the agent to take eighty-one
percent of the loan revenues, which the court held to be a predominant economic interest. Id.
at 1355. Such an agreement is unlawful in Georgia following this Court's holding. Id. at
1358.
149. Summary of SB157; Payday Lending, at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/
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economic interest in the revenues generated by payday loans,"' 50 out-of-
state banks will have difficulty attracting in-state agents.15' Agents will
be unlikely to take on the hefty responsibilities of operating a payday
lending outlet without a large economic incentive. 152 Because agents
typically handle out-of-state payday lending for banks, Bankwest has
effectively eliminated rent-a-charter payday lending in Georgia through
the use of agents. 153
By avoiding the question of what constitutes a predominant
economic interest in the loans, the Bankwest court left open the
common sense possibility that agents may receive up to 49% of the
revenue from the loans, making sure not to cross the 50% threshold that
would then constitute a majority of the revenue and likely predominant
economic interest. 54  Those outside the court take predominant
economic interest to mean that an agent may not make more from the
loan than the bank it represents, or "the 'agent' will be held liable for
violating the law as a de facto lender.' '155  However, given that the
agents in Bankwest v. Baker received 81% of the revenue of the loan, to
only receive 49% represents a significant economic hit to the agent's
pocket, one so dramatic the agents will likely be unwilling to continue
in this payday lending agency scheme.
56
B. Other States Will Likely Enact Legislation Restricting Payday
Lending in a Similar Manner to Georgia's Legislation at Issue
in Bankwest v. Baker
The court in Bankwest v. Baker deferred to state lawmakers,
indicating it was the prerogative of the legislature to regulate payday
lending in Georgia. 15' This position suggests a reluctance on the part of
this court to overrule state laws regarding payday lending, and indicates
GA bill-summary.PDF (last visited Nov. 20, 2004).
150. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-17-1(c) (2004).
151. Bankwest, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 1346.
152. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
153. Bankwest, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 1333.
154. Id. at 1354-55. The court failed to identify predominant economic interest, but
found that receiving 81% of the loan revenue, as the agents at issue did, constituted a clear
predominant economic interest. Id. at 1355.
155. See Summary of SB 157, supra note 149.
156. Bankwest v. Baker, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
157. Id. at 1357.
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that other states may soon step in to regulate all payday lending within
their borders.1 58 Following in the wake of Bankwest v. Baker, states are
likely to close loopholes that allow out-of-state banks to bypass state
usury laws through in-state agents.
59
Until Bankwest v. Baker, many states outlawed payday lending,
but their laws only reached in-state lenders.160  Bankwest v. Baker is
likely to have an important impact on payday lending in states across
the country, as state lawmakers will likely follow Georgia's lead in
implementing statutes to effectively outlaw such rent-a-charter practices
within their borders.'16  Currently, both New York and West Virginia
have introduced house bills aimed at stopping payday lending within
their borders. 62  New York's bill provides that no "foreign banking
corporation shall make any payday loan, either directly or indirectly, or
make any loan to any other lender for purposes of financing a payday
loan or refinancing or extending any payday loan."' 163 West Virginia has
proposed that
[n]o person may engage in the business of making,
arranging, acting as a middleman for, or brokering cash
advances or loans to persons for any personal, family or
household purpose under any agreement in which
checks, share drafts or authorizations to debit accounts
of consumers are used as security or as a direct or
indirect part of a transaction for an advance, loan or
158. Id.
159. See infra notes 160-66 and accompanying text. With so many states already
regulating payday lending, the holding in Bankwest v. Baker is likely to give other states the
confidence to enact similar legislation with the expectation that it too will be held
constitutional. See supra notes 38-46.
160. See Hartsoe, supra note 1. America's Cash Express, a payday lender operating in
North Carolina, is currently fighting North Carolina's ban on payday lending, arguing that
because it teamed with an out-of-state bank, America's Cash Express is exempt from
adhering to such a ban. Id.
161. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text. With all states currently regulating
payday lending in some way, as well as the disfavor this lending practice garners from many
state and local regulators, one may expect to see tougher regulations similar to the Georgia
Act. See supra notes 38-46.
162. See infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.




extension of credit, and in which the payment of checks,
share drafts or the debit of accounts is deferred. 64
Both of these bills aim to do what the Georgia legislature accomplished,
which is to regulate payday lending within its borders, even by out-of-
state banks. 165  The New York bill aims to prohibit foreign bank
corporations from making such loans, and the West Virginia bill targets
lenders who take checks or deferred payments as collateral for loans,




Many states already have statutes outlawing payday lending
practices for banks within their borders, and Bankwest v. Baker may
provide the backbone other states need to enact tougher legislation to
reach out-of-state banks. 167  Condemned by federal regulators and
judicially mandated to comply with state law in Georgia, out-of-state
payday lenders using agents to conduct business where otherwise they
could not, likely have only numbered days left until extinction.1 68 If
states pass payday lending laws similar to the new Georgia law, out-of-
state payday lenders will be forced to restructure their agency
relationships with in-state outlets.169 Unable to secure a majority of the
loan revenue agents are likely to find it economically infeasible to
continue operating. 170 Without agents, out-of-state payday lenders will
find it more difficult to engage in payday lending through rent-a-charter
arrangements with in-state agents.' 7 ' The marketplace will have a
164. H.B. 2222, 2003-2004 Leg., 76th Sess. (W.Va. 2003), available at http://www.
legis.state.wv.us/legishp.html.
165. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 16-17
(2004).
166. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 159-66 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 57-74 and accompanying text.
169. See Summary of SB157, supra note 149 and accompanying text. Agents will be
unable to retain the large percentage of the loan revenues they currently receive, because
earning 85% to 95% of the loan revenues constitutes receiving a clear predominant
economic interest. See id.
170. See id.
171. Bankwest v. Baker, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (N.D. Ga. 2004). The Bankwest case
alters the agency relationship of payday lending, and holds that agents may not receive a
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greater need for alternative programs offering small, short-term loans at
more reasonable interest rates, as well as providing sound financial
strategies to avoid falling into the cycle of needing such loans.1 2  By
eliminating out-of-state banks' ability to offer payday loans through
agents, in-state banks and credit unions are more likely to enter the
market of offering short-term loans, 173 and these institutions will be
subject to individual state usury regulations governing small dollar
loans. 174  The elimination of exorbitant lending fees associated with
payday lending outlets is extremely beneficial to short-term
borrowers. 1
7 5
Other states should consider following Georgia's lead and enact
similar statutes because payday lending is a harmful, cyclic practice
aimed at an at-risk group of borrowers. 176 These borrowers are likely to
be harmed by such lending rather than helped, because the likelihood of
rollover and greater debt are almost certain to follow the initial payday
loan. 177 Statutes similar to the Georgia law will effectively shut down
rent-a-charter practices, because agents likely will be unwilling to
predominant economic interest in payday loan revenues. Id. at 1355. Out-of-state banks,
such as Bankwest in this case, will be unable to continue operating through these agents and
will be forced into an alternative means of offering these loans, such as opening a branch in
state which will be subject to state usury laws. Id. at 1356-57.
172. See supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
173. See STATE EMPLOYEES CREDIT UNION, supra note 28. The SECU in North Carolina
entered into the marketplace of offering short-term loans and others are sure to follow. See
supra note 85 and accompanying text. Short-term loans are a necessity for some borrowers,
however, financial planning and counseling, as provided by SECU's Salary Advance
Program, are necessary to avoid the cycle in which most borrowers are entrapped with
payday loans. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
174. See generally Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General, New York
Sues to Stop Illegal Payday Lending Scheme (Sept. 24, 2003), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/sep/sep24a03.html. New York, like most states,
regulates the interest rate on small dollar loans. Id. If New York lawmakers pass legislation
similar to that at issue in Bankwest v. Baker, out-of-state institutions offering payday loans
will be subject to those state regulations as well. Id. In New York, lenders are prohibited
from charging more than sixteen percent on loans under $500, a far cry from the 500% APR
payday lenders typically charge. Id.
175. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text. Payday loans are typically rolled
over because the high interest rate generally prohibits borrowers from being able to pay off
their debt on their next payday. See supra note 37 and accompanying text; see also STATE
EMPLOYEES CREDIT UNION, supra note 28.
176. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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provide the majority of the loan service without receiving a
predominant economic interest in the revenue.'78
ELIZABETH WILLOUGHBY
178. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
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